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ABSTRACT 
 
In our politico-philosophical bestiary, no monster has historically been more prominent 
than the Leviathan, the whale of the Book of Job, transformed by Hobbes, which has long 
been ubiquitous as a metaphor or as a signifier in all intellectual traditions touching upon 
the political. Like the state itself, we argue, the Leviathan has played an outsized role in the 
way we theorize and imagine relations of sovereignty in the world. This essay seeks to add a 
new hermeneutical creature to the bestiary: the Kraken. Said to be huge and to lurk in 
Norway’s icy waters, the Kraken first emerged in the accounts of natural philosophers in 
the eighteenth century, at the very moment when political economy was becoming the 
premier science of governance in Europe. Leviathan is an emblem of a kind of state that no 
longer exists and has never existed, and it remains our most potent emblem of the state’s 
reification, a relentlessly compelling figure that has long blinded historians to alternate 
sovereignties within, across, and outside the physical territories of states. From stateless 
financial capital to multinational corporations acting like states on the world stage, such 
forms of sovereignty are an essential feature of the global politics we are now living, but 







Leviathan and Kraken: States, Corporations, and Political Economy 
Kraken, (der) Kraak, Kraaken, Kraxen, a 
Norwegian designation for the largest known 
sea monster in the world, which is sometimes 
glimpsed in northern waters, and compared to 
which whales are dwarfs…  
—Johann Georg Krünitz, ed., Oekonomische 
Encyklopädie oder allgemeines System der 
Staats- Stadt- Haus- und Landwirthschaft, vol. 
46 (Brünn: Traßler, 1791), p. 666. 
 
The history of Western political thought suggests that monsters are good to think with.1 And 
no hermeneutic monster has loomed larger in this tradition than the Leviathan, the whale of 
                                                          
1 See, for two of almost innumerable examples, Plato, Republic: Books 6-10, eds. and trans. 
Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library 276 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), 374-77, 588c-e, and Bartolo of Sassoferrato, De regimine 
civitatis, I, in Diego Quaglioni, ed., Politica e diritto nel Trecento italiano: Il “De tyranno” di 
Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314–1357) con l’edizione critica dei trattati “De guelphis et 
gebellinis”, “De regimine civitatis” e “De tyranno” (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1983), at 152. 
See also David Armitage, “The Elephant and the Whale: Empires and Oceans in World 
History,” in id., Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 46-56. 
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Job 41 turned by Hobbes into a political-symbolic Frankenstein’s monster: part machine, 
part artificial man, part Biblical monster, part “mortall god”.2 Here we begin to think by 
venturing into the bowels of this beast. In an oft-cited passage in Leviathan, Hobbes noted 
that “corporations” are “lesser common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the 
entrayles of a natural man.”3 As David Armitage has noted, “companies and states were 
divergent species within the genus of corporations, in the Roman-law sense of collective 
bodies represented as persons for the purpose of fulfilling duties and bearing rights,” and 
the question remains why the English crown increasingly “sub-contracted the marks of 
sovereignty” to mercantile corporations in Early Modernity.4 Why, to maintain the 
Hobbesian analogy, the body politic would so purposefully nourish its own parasites. But 
perhaps this question is mal posée. From our temporal vantage point—when a New York 
Times op-ed can speak to knowing readers of “‘multinational’ or ‘stateless’ capital 
diminish[ing] the sovereignty of individual countries, including the United States, and 
                                                          
2 Rüdiger Voigt, “Zur Staatskonzeption von Thomas Hobbes”, 41-63, in Voigt, ed., Der 
Leviathan (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 55.  
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 230. On the frequency of its quotation, see Philip J. Stern, “Parasites, Persons, and 
Princes: Evolutionary Biology of the Corporate Constitution,” Itinerario 39.3 (2015): 512-
515, at 513. 
4 David Armitage, “Wider Still and Wider: Corporate Constitutionalism Unbounded,” 
Itinerario 39.3 (2005): 501-503.  
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strengthen[ing] the autonomy of international corporations”5—it seems that we may remain 
too fixated upon Leviathans as wielders of sovereignty, however fragmented, and may still 
not be interested enough in those putatively “lesser” commonwealths. The long history of 
international business, most evidently with the rise of the modern multinational corporation 
but observable also in cases of individual entrepreneurs and corporations dating back to the 
Middle Ages, should continue to remind us that the tendrils described by Hobbes need not 
always be intestinal worms, embraced entirely in the body of the Leviathan. Could they be, 
instead, the tentacles of something compared to which even Leviathans are dwarfs?  
* * * 
Scholars had long told of something large, something monstrously large, lurking in 
Scandinavian waters: in a posthumous 1655 work the Dane Ole Worm listed the enormous 
Hafgufe, “more like an island than an animal”, among the known species of whales, as did 
his countryman Thomas Bartholin soon after.6 And in the late 1670s the German physician 
                                                          
5 Thomas B. Edsall, “Free Trade Disagreement”, New York Times, 4 February 2014, online 
at www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/opinion/edsall-free-trade-disagreement.html. 
6 Olaus Worm, Museum Wormianum, seu, Historia rerum rariorum, tam naturalium, quam 
artificialium, tam domesticarum, quam exoticarum (Leiden: Elsevier, 1655), 280; Thomas 
Bartholinus, Historiarum anatomicarum rariorum centuria III et IV (The Hague: Vlacq, 
1657), 175-6, where he also elides this creature with the Jasconius of the Legend of St. 
Brendan. The sea-monster or whale so big that it is mistaken for an island was a medieval 
trope; see, for example, the entry for cetus (whale) in “The Bestiary of Philippe de Thaun” 
[=British Library, Cotton MS Nero AV], transcribed in Thomas Wright, ed., 
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Christian Franz Paullini related what he had heard from his friend Ambrosius Rhode, 
among the most learned naturalists in Christiania (Oslo), about a sea monster (monstrum 
quoddam marinum) living in the vicinity of Wardehuß castle, present-day Vardø in 
Finnmark, called a Seekrabbe, and crab-like in appearance, but so monstrously large that a 
whole regiment of soldiers could comfortably be deployed on its back.7 But the Kraken itself, 
                                                          
Popular Treatises on Science Written during the Middle Ages, in Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-
Norman, and English (London: Taylor, 1841), 74-131; the cetus, with sand on its back, is 
mistaken for an island and when sailors build their camp and set fires on its back, it 
drowns them; for Philippe and his tradition, this was to be understood allegorically: “the 
cetus is the devil, and the sea is the world… and the sands are the riches of the world… and 
the fire is love, because man loves his gold, his gold and his silver…”, 108. See, for medieval 
Scandinavian references, Richard Constant Boer, ed., Ǫrvar-Odds Saga (Leiden: Brill, 
1888), 132; and Laurence Marcellus Larson, trans., The King’s Mirror (Speculum regale-
Konungs skuggsjá) (New York: The American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1917), 125. 
Worm had read the latter in manuscript; in 1768 its editio princeps (from what is now Ms. 
AM 243 i fol., Library of the Arnamagnæanske Institut, Stockholm) was published along 
with a Latin translation as Halfdan Einersen, ed., Kongs-Skugg-Sio utlögdt a Daunsku og 
Latinu (Sorøe: Lindgren).  
7 Christianus Franciscus Paullinus, "Observatio LI. De singulari monstro marino", 
in Miscellanea curiosa, sive Ephemeridum medico-physicarum Germanicarum Academiae 
Naturae Curiosorum annus octavus (Breslau and Brieg: Jacob, 1678), 79-80. The Seekrabbe 
is described as similar in form to the “heracleotic crab or maia, depicted by Gesner”, for 
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like political economy, only emerged from the shadowy depths as an object of direct and 
intense scholarly attention in the mid eighteenth century.8  
It was the polymathic Danish Enlightenment Cameralist and Bishop of Bergen Erik 
Pontoppidan, in his Natural History of Norway, who presented the most famous account of 
“incontestably the largest Sea-monster in the world”: 
It is called Kraken, Kraxen, or, as some name it, Krabben, that word being 
applied by way of eminence to this creature. This last name seems indeed best 
to agree with the description of this creature, which is round, flat, and full of 
arms, or branches. Others call it also Horven, or Soe-horven, and some Anker-
trold. Among all the foreign writers, both ancient and modern, which I had 
had the opportunity to consult on this subject, not one of them seems to know 
much of this creature, or at least to have a just idea of it. What they say of 
                                                          
which see, e.g., Conrad Gessner, Nomenclator aquatilium animantium: Icones animalium in 
mari et dulcibus aquis plusquam DCC, 3rd edition (Heidelberg: Lancellotus, 1606), 203-05, 
with illustrations, under the heading Maea  (given in German as “ein grosser Seekrabbe”), 
but krabbe like krake(n) seems to have had a semantic range in the North capable of 
including crabs and cephalopods (and even cnidarians), such that the Icelandic word for 
octopus is now Kolkrabbi.  
8 On the rise to prominence of political economy at the time, see Steven L. Kaplan and 
Sophus A. Reinert, eds., The Economic Turn: Recasting Political Economy in Enlightenment 




floating islands… will be found applicable without any hyperbole to this 
creature…9 
                                                          
9 Erik Pontoppidan, Det første Forsøg paa Norges naturlige Historie, volume 2 
(Copenhagen: Lille, 1753), 340-354; we quote the English translation, A Natural History of 
Norway (London: Linde, 1755), part 2, 210. Tennyson’s poem “The Kraken” with its 
apocalyptic imagery, telling of the Kraken dreamlessly sleeping at the sea’s bottom “until 
the latter fire shall heat the deep”,  was, at least in part, based on the entry for 
Pontoppidan in volume 35 of the Biographie universelle published in Paris in 1823; for this 
see Christopher Ricks, ed., Tennyson: A Selected Edition (London: Routledge, 2007, 117-
18). And Melville, who will return below, and who had naturally read widely in the lore of 
sea monsters, explicitly mentioned “the giant Kraken of Bishop Pontoppidan”, associating 
it with the squid; Moby-Dick (New York: Penguin, 1992 [1851]), chapter 59, 302. Properly 
speaking, Kraken (with the enclitic -n as a definite article) is the Kraken, where an 
indefinite being of the same type is a Krake. Somewhat earlier than Pontoppidan the Swede 
Carl von Linné, i.e., Linnaeus, then a young physician and botanist in Uppsala, included a 
creature called microcosmus in the first edition of his Fauna svecica, sistens animalia 
Sveciae Regni (Stockholm: Salvius, 1746), saying of it, dismissively, “It is reported to live in 
the Norwegian sea; I myself have not yet seen this animal”, 386 (item 1351), and deleting it 
entirely from the second edition (Stockholm: Salvius, 1761). Microcosmus has been taken as 
a reference to the Kraken, naturally, but Linnaeus’s citations somewhat confuse the 
matter: he cites the accounts, mentioned above, of Bartholin and Paullini, but also 
inexplicably references a Latin translation of Francesco Redi’s Osservazioni intorno agli 
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Pontoppidan, drawing on the “unanimous” reports of fishermen and sailors, declared the 
Kraken to be one and a half English miles in circumference and covered in tentacula, being 
akin—he surmised—to the polyp or star-fish; but the Kraken would in due course become a 
cephalopod.  [INSERT IMAGE 1] 
  
                                                          
animali viventi che si trovano negli animali viventi (Florence: Matini, 1684), which deals 
chiefly with parasites and similarly non-colossal things. Indeed, the “microcosmus 
marinus”—so-called because it looks like a miniature world, complete with hills and valleys 
and trees, whence Linnaeus’s odd name for the Norwegian sea monster—that is depicted in 
tabula XXII of Redi, De animalculis vivis quae in corporibus animalium vivorum reperiuntur 
observationes (Amsterdam: Wetstein, 1708), 322, is apparently the wholly (indeed almost 
comically) un-Krakeny sea squirt (appropriately now the bearer of the Microcosmus 
genus). Linnaeus may have only known of Redi’s microcosmus second-hand, from the 
account in the Acta eruditorum of Leipzig for 1686, at 48-52. The name Microcosmus stuck 
to the Kraken for some time; see, e.g., the entry under the heading “S[epia] Microcosmus, 





Image 1 caption: Sea Serpent, from Erik Pontoppidan, The Natural History of Norway, 





In 1783 Sir Joseph Banks presented to the Royal Society in London “An account of 
Ambergris” by one Dr. Schwediawer, who recalled being told by a whaler about an 
incomplete but still nearly 27-feet-long “tentaculum of the sepia octopodia” found in the belly 
of a whale.10 Inspired by this account, the French naturalist Pierre Denys de Montfort sought 
out similar tales among the New England whalers resident in Dunkirk, and in his early 
nineteenth-century malacological addendum to Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle laid out the case 
for the actual existence of “le poulpe colossal” and “le poulpe kraken”, the colossal octopus 
and the Kraken octopus, the latter having (following Pontopiddan’s description) a more 
peaceful temperament.11 [INSERT IMAGE 2] 
  
                                                          
10 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 73 (1783): 226-241.  
11 Pierre Denys de Montfort, Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière des mollusques: 
Animaux sans vertèbres et a sang blanc; Ouvrage faisant suite aux Œuvres de Leclerc de 
Buffon, et partie du cours complet d'Histoire naturelle rédigée par C.S. Sonnini, volume 2 





Image 2 caption: The Colossal Octopus, from Pierre Denys de Montfort, Histoire 
naturelle… des mollusques, volume 2, Paris: Dufart, 1801-2 
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It was similarly two meticulous accounts of giant cephalopod carcasses discovered on 
the Icelandic coast—one in 1639, recorded by the chronicler Björn Jónsson á Skarðsá; the 
other in 1790, in a letter sent to the naturalist Sveinn Pálsson, describing the enormous body 
of a Kolkrabbe—that set the Danish zoologist Japetus Steenstrup, with whom Darwin 
extensively corresponded about barnacles in the 1840s-50s, on the trail of the giant squid, 
the world's largest (known) invertebrate, which he first described and named Architeuthus 
(now Architeuthis); and so the Kraken and Architeuthis have been linked ever since.12  
* * * 
                                                          
12 Japetus Steenstrup, "Meddelelse om tvende Kæmpestore Blæksprutter, opdrevne 1639 
og 1790 ved Islands Kyst, og om nogle andre nordiske Dyr", in Forhandlinger ved de 
Skandinaviske Naturforskeres, fifth meeting, 12-17 July 1847 (Copenhagen: S. Triers, 1849), 
950-57, with an excerpt, at 953-54, from the manuscript Dagbøger of Pálsson's 1791-92 
travels around Iceland, for which see also "Udtog af Hr. Paulsens Dagbog holden paa hans 
Reise til og i Island fra den 2den Julii til 7de Sept. 1791", in Skrivter af Naturhistorie-
Selskabet, volume 2 (Copenhagen: Møller, 1792), 222-234, 122-146; volume 3 (1793), 157-
94. The 1639 record is found in Annalar Biørns a Skardsa, sive, Annales Biörnonis de 
Skardsa: Ex manuscriptis inter se collatis, cum interpretatione Latina, variantibus lectionibus, 
notis, et indice, volume 2 (Hrappseya: Hoff, 1775), 238-39, and it was widely disseminated 
in Messrs. Olafsen and Povelsen [=Eggert Ólafsson and Bjarni Pálsson], Travels in Iceland: 
Performed by Order of His Danish Majesty (London: Phillips, 1805), 125-6, who suggested, 




“Stop, stop!” cried the monster, in a pleading 
voice. “Do you mean to tell me that the earth 
people, whom I have always respected, 
compare me to the Stannerd Oil Company?” 
… 
“It is unjust! It is cruel and unjust!” sobbed 
the creature, mournfully. “Just because we 
have several long arms, and take whatever we 
can reach, they accuse us of being like—like—
oh, I cannot say it! It is too shameful—too 
humiliating!” 
—The Octopus, speaking in L. Frank Baum, 
The Sea Fairies (Chicago: Reilly & Britton, 
1911), 104-5. 
 
The metaphorically maritime or oceanic qualities of capitalism (and of capital, credit, and 
commerce itself) have long been stressed. Many would argue that humans have approached 
the sea as a “bridge” or a “highway” rather than a “barrier” from time immemorial, and 
oceans have, not surprisingly, almost instinctively been considered spaces and vectors of 
exchange in large parts of the world.13 As the Swedish-educated Göttingen historian 
                                                          
13 See, for one of very many examples, Karen Nero, “The Material World Remade,” in 
Donald Denoon (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders (Cambridge: 
13 
 
August Ludwig von Schlözer put it in his An Attempt at a General History of Trade and 
Navigation from the Earliest Times, written at the beginning of the “economic turn” of the 
eighteenth century, his two subjects had to be considered in unison because “one cannot 
imagine trade without navigation.”14 Not only were oceans materially good for commerce, 
their characteristics—openness, fluidity, transnationality, tempestuousness— naturally lent 
themselves to metaphorical equations with the worlds of trade. Already in the early 
seventeenth century the London merchant and pamphleteer Gerard de Malynes accused 
his theoretical opponent Edward Misselden of having “drowned… in the Sea of 
Exchanges,” just as the eighteenth-century merchant handbook The Accomplish’d 
Merchant opened by stating that anyone embarking on a career as a merchant took “a 
plunge into the Ocean of Trade.”15 Along similar lines, private property itself could be 
                                                          
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 359-396, at 368. On the early history of this 
engagement, see Lincoln Paine, The Sea and Civilization: A Maritime History of the World 
(New York: Knopf, 2013), discussing the world’s oldest depictions of boats, by North-
Norwegian reindeer hunters, at 11-12, and the peopling of Oceania at 13. The oldest known 
depiction now dates back 10,000-11,000 years, see “Boat Petroglyph Discovered in 
Northern Norway,” Archaeology, 27 September 2017, 
https://www.archaeology.org/news/5948-170927-norway-petroglyph-boat.  
14 August Ludwig von Schlözer, Försök til en allmän historia om handel och sjöfart uti the 
äldsta tider (Stockholm: Grefing, 1758), 2. 
15 Gerard de Malynes, The Center of the Circle of Commerce (London: Jones, 1623),  137; 
Anonymous, The Accomplish’d Merchant (London: n.p., n.d.), 1. 
14 
 
considered “a drop of water in the ocean of credit.”16 Few better descriptions of this 
phenomenon, still so influential in the twenty-first century, exist than that offered critically 
by the American Unitarian Minister Orville Dewey: 
Having forsaken the path of regular and moderate and sure acquisition, in which 
his fathers walked, he has plunged into an ocean of credit, spread the sails of 
adventurous speculation, is tossed upon the giddy and uncertain waves of a 
fluctuating currency, and liable, any day, to be wrecked by the storms that are 
sweeping over the world of business.17 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, octopus and squid imagery has likewise been used to 
think about business. In the late nineteenth century, for example, the Harvard railroad 
engineer Thomas Curtis Clark noted—viewing the octopus-business more charitably than 
most, and with an implicit nod in the other direction—that “The Denver and Rio Grande 
[Western Railroad] has been compared to an octopus. This is really a compliment to its 
engineers. It sucks nutriment from every place where nutriment is to be found.”18 Alien in 
                                                          
16 Samuel Hibbert, Remarks on the Facility of Obtaining Commercial Credit; or, An 
Exposure of the Various Deceptions by which Credit is Procured (Manchester: Cowdroy, 
1806), 12.  
17 Orville Dewey, Moral Views of Commerce, Society, and Politics in Twelve Discourses 
(London: Fox, 1838), 91. 
18 Thomas Curtis Clarke, “The Building of a Railway,” in Thomas M. Cooley, ed., The 
Railways of America: Their Construction, Development, Management, and Appliances 
(London: Murray, 1890), 1-46, quotation at 17. 
15 
 
appearance, ecology, and intelligence; camouflaged or hidden in the lightless depths; 
elusive and frighteningly tentacular,19 cephalopods have more commonly been identified 
                                                          
19 For a philosophical primer on cephalopod intelligence and what it means for human 
beings, see Peter Godfrey-Smith, Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins 
of Consciousness (New York: Ferrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2016). We now know what was 
long suspected, that cephalopods are evolutionarily-speaking real oddities; see Caroline B. 
Albertin et al., "The Octopus Genome and the Evolution of Cephalopod Neural and 
Morphological Novelties", Nature 524 (2015): 220-224. The "alien" character of the 
class Cephalopoda likely explains the weirdly capacious territory, from the horrific to the 
erotic, occupied in the human imagination by such tentacled creatures. The examples of H. 
P. Lovecraft's 1928 short story "The Call of Cthulhu" and Hokusai's 1814 woodblock 
print Tako to ama (commonly called "The Dream of the Fisherman's Wife"), both 
extraordinary in their own way, must suffice here; on them see Sophus A. Reinert, 
"The Economy of Fear: H. P. Lovecraft on Eugenics, Economics and the Great 
Depression," Horror Studies 6.2 (2015): 255–282; and Richard Bru, "Tentacles of Love and 
Death: From Hokusai to Picasso", in Secret Images: Picasso and the Japanese Erotic 
Print (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2010),  50-77. We suspect that part of the terrible 
allure of the cephalopod relates to it being, in a certain sense, singular and plural at the 
same time. Jorge Luis Borges captures this strange frisson abundantly when he refers 
to something climbing up a flight of stairs as being "opresivo y lento y plural", our 
emphasis, at the end of his Lovecraft homage "There are More Things", Obras completas: 
1975-1983 (Emecé, 1989), 37. We are also certainly aware of the fact that the legally-fictive 
16 
 
with monopolistic power and behavior, formal but particularly informal empire, with 
infiltration, usurpation, thievery, strangulation, and, most broadly, whatever one 
considered evil.  
                                                          
corporation too shares this singular-plural quality; as, naturally, does the artificial man 
depicted in Hobbes's Leviathan frontispiece, which Noel Malcolm has called "the most 
famous visual image in the history of political philosophy"; "The Titlepage of Leviathan, 
Seen in a Curious Perspective", The Seventeenth Century 13.2 (1998):124-155, at 124. That 
such an artificial or corporate man, a man made of other men, can similarly be a source of 
horror (and even repulsion) is more than apparent in Clive Barker's 1984 short story "In 
the Hills, the Cities", reprinted in Books of Blood: Volumes One to Three (New York: 




Image 4 caption: G.F. Keller, “The Curse of California,” published in The Wasp, 19 August 1882. 











Image 5 caption: “The English Octopus”, as reprinted in Coin’s Financial School 
(Chicago: Coin, 1894), 124, but first published in Denver’s The Road newspaper. Note: As 
in this anti-Semitic fantasy, images of financial octopi often played on widespread 










Image 6 Caption: Next!, illustration by Udo J. Keppler, in Puck, 7 September 1904; 









Though the most popular visual meme of this sort in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries depicted the Standard Oil Company, particularly in the form given it 
by political cartoonist, and son of Puck magazine’s founder, Udo J. Keppler in 1904, giant 
squids or octopuses have appeared in visual critiques of “landlordism,” Russian influences 
in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, supposed Jewish conspiracies, various aspects of 
British imperialism, the imperialism of the US Dollar, how Japan “menaces world trade” 
during World War II, the claims of European powers in Africa, saloons during prohibition, 
American business interests in France during the Cold War, political corruption, the 
mafia, Communism and—more than anything else—Capitalism.20 [INSERT IMAGES 3-6 
WHERE BEST FIT] 
 
  
                                                          
20 The web is awash with such images. See, for example, Allison C. Meier, “The Octopus, a 
Motif of Evil in Historical Propaganda Maps,” Hyperallergic, 8 May 2017, 
https://hyperallergic.com/375900/the-map-octopus-a-propaganda-motif-of-spreading-evil, 
drawing efficiently on Persuasive Maps: PJ Mode Collection, Cornell University Library 
and Frank Jacobs, “Cartography’s Favourite Map Monster: The Land Octopus,” 
BigThink, http://bigthink.com/strange-maps/521-cartographys-favourite-map-monster-the-
land-octopus. As well as the short-lived blog Vulgar Army: Ocoprop to Octopop dedicated to 
“Octopus Propaganda and Political Cartoons,” https://octoprop.wordpress.com.  
22 
 
“Corruption,” wrote the socialist Charles C. Hitchcock in 1912, echoing an already 
venerable trope, “will doubtless continue to manifest itself until the grasp of the octopus of 
Capitalism is destroyed.”21 The same metaphor has frequently appeared for specific 
aspects or embodiments of capitalism, such as banks, which are seen grabbing with the 
“octopus-like tentacles” of finance.22 And there was often something about the legal form of 
the corporation that specifically called for the deployment of the cephalopodic: American 
politician James Baird Weaver was hardly the only person to complain about the Supreme 
Court’s decision to “enfranchise this modern octopus [the corporation], and clothe it with 
all the rights of citizenship.”23 As these nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples 
suggest, our politico-economic bestiary is simply not complete without some monstrous 
species of cephalopod. Nor is such usage now defunct, not at all: the Koch Brothers’ vast 
business and political empire is called “the Kochtopus” by enemies and bemused observers 
alike, and the left-wing journalist Matt Taibbi (in)famously began a piece for Rolling Stone 
in 2010 with this line: “The first thing you need to know about Goldman Sachs is that it’s 
everywhere. The world’s most powerful investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped 
                                                          
21 Charles C. Hitchcock, The Socialist Argument (Chicago: Kerr & Company, n.d. but 
1912), 130. 
22 John Hughes, Liverpool Banks & Bankers, 1760-1837: A History of the Circumstances 
Which Gve Rise to the Industry, and the Men Who Founded and Developed It (Liverpool: 
Young, 1906), 100. 
23 James Baird Weaver, A Call to Action: An Interpretation of the Great Uprising, Its Sources 
and Causes (Des Moines: Iowa Printing Company, 1892), 108-109. 
23 
around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that 
smells like money.”24 Nor has the cephalopodic discourse remained confined to the 
propagandistic. It was first in the eighteenth century, the great Fernand Braudel once 
wrote, that the “octopus grip of European trade … extended to cover the whole world”.25 
And, indeed, it was then that the tentacled empire of capital began to outgrow—or to once 
again outstrip—the Leviathans that had emerged in the previous two centuries, and when 
the Kraken seriously came to inform the disciplines of political economy and philosophy, as 
was the case when the Istrian statesman and reformer Gianrinaldo Carli wrote a poem, 
playing on the widespread belief that the single parts of cephalopods could regenerate, 
about how the “parts of the gutted Empire [of Rome], like the body of a squid, formed new 
bodies.”26 As it were, the plurality of the Kraken’s body is itself a reminder of the 
multiplicity of bodies in political economy.   
                                                                                      ***
24 “Dissecting the Kochtopus”, The Economist, 7 June 2014, online at  
www.economist.com/business/2014/06/07/dissecting-the-kochtopus is one example; Matt 
Taibbi, “The Great American Bubble Machine”, Rolling Stone, 5 April 2010, online at 
www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-195229. 
25 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, volume 3, trans. Siân Reynold (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), 29. 
26 Gianrinaldo Carli, L’Andropologia, ossia della societa’, e della felicita’, in Canti III, in id., 
Delle opere del signor commendatore Don Gianrinaldo Conte Carli, 19 vols. (Milan: 
Nell’imperial monistero di s. A. Maggiore, 1789), vol. 16, 306, a variation of which 
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Like Leviathan, the metaphorical Kraken can help clarify (perhaps to starkly clarify) 
relations of sovereignty in the world. There are no universally-accepted definitions of 
“sovereignty,” but, in his recent work on partially-independent localities, David A. Rezvani 
has suggested that it can be “described as a polity’s power of de facto and de jure priority in 
some respects over a territory.”40 Even such an expansive definition of the phenomenon, 
however, remains focused on the power of a “polity” in relation to other polities, and thus 
still within the confines of the Hobbesian chiaroscuro. From our perspective, the Kraken can 
serve as a metaphor for alien bodies that, operating in fluid realms beyond (even if literally 
within) the terroirs of Leviathan states, nonetheless acquire power in and over disparate 
lands or domains, whether in the form of Standard Oil’s corporate control over diverse parts 
of US resources, lands, institutions, and economy or, for that matter, of the Jesuits’ control 
of a global network of people, places, assets, and aspirations—from the secret archives of the 
Vatican to the deep jungles of Paraguay—during the early modern period.41 Indeed, though 
                                                          
reappeared in Avogadro della Motta Emiliano, Saggio intorno al socialismo e alle dottrine e 
tendenze socialistiche, 2 vols. (S. Pier d’Arena: S. Vincenzo de’ Paoli, 1879), vol. II, 250. 
40 David A. Rezvani, Surpassing the Sovereign State: The Wealth, Self-Rule, and Security 
Advantages of Partially Independent Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4, 
77. 
41 See, on the Jesuits from this perspective, Luke Clossey, Salvation and Globalization in the 
Early Jesuit Missions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and the 
organization’s “dromography” at 10. On the Paraguay mission in particular, see Girolamo 
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the Kraken, in its plural, corporate form, can superficially be portrayed as a creature of 
dominium (rule over things) rather than imperium (rule over people), if one follows it down 
into its abyssal element one quickly discerns that it can secure the latter through the former. 
It is through its dominions that it ultimately achieves de facto or de jure empire over people, 
across a wide arc ranging from simply inflecting patterns of consumption to literally 
providing employment, education, health, and security in formal concessions, i.e. all the way 
to essentially acting in loco status. The Kraken, in short, can enjoy sovereignties within and 
across numerous Leviathans (and Leviathan-free zones) without being limited to any one of 
them. What such an expanded bestiary allows for is thus a more nuanced, if perhaps 
somewhat phantasmagorical view of power and sovereignty in political economy, one in 
which a multiplicity of actors compete for power (for Sovereign power even) in the world, 
from states and families through corporations and religious orders. The penumbral pre-
modern post-modern aesthetic in which the Kraken image competes with the Leviathan 
image and perhaps, in the end, engulfs and cannibalizes it, might be termed baroquepunk.42  
                                                          
Imbruglia, L’invenzione del Paraguay: Studio sull’idea di comunità ra Seicento e Settecento 
(Naples: Bibliopolis, 2007). 
42 The baroquepunk heuristic would bridge the conceptual arc from the early, 
Thrasymachean chapters of Stephen R. Bown, Merchant Kings: When Companies Ruled the 
World, 1600–1900 (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2009) to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s 
Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), by way of Frederic Jameson, 
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1991), 38, 419, and of course William Gibson’s genre-defining 1984 novel, 
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Though on the extreme margins of historiography, whether of the eighteenth century 
or today, the harrowing history of Liberia offers an enlightening lens through which we may 
study the bestiary of political economy and the dynamics of power in an economic age. The 
country had hosted a number of small kingdoms and chiefdoms in the early modern period, 
but, beginning already in 1461, Portuguese, then Dutch and British traders, individually as 
well as in a corporate capacity, began to establish trading posts in the region. These were not 
colonies of the type that would flourish in the nineteenth century, but rather private, fortified 
“factories,” containing markets, warehouses, and housing for merchants, workers, and 
soldiers, with their own systems of law responsible for their own protection and mutual aid. 
                                                          
Neuromancer (London: Penguin, 2000), 196, where we read: “Power, in [this] world, meant 
corporate power. The zaibatsus, the multinationals that shaped the course of human 
history, had transcended old barriers. Viewed as organisms, they had attained a kind of 
immortality.” Jameson saw cyberpunk as the quintessential generic expression of the 
“transnational corporate realities” and “global paranoia” of the 1980s and, more recently, 
Paul Youngquist has questioned whether cyberpunk remains a useful concept or whether it 
reflects only the “old dystopian daydream of Reaganomics gone global”; “Cyberpunk, 
War, and Money: Neal Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon”, Contemporary Literature 53.2 
(2012): 319-344, quotation at 319. We await Baroquepunk’s essential literary expression, 
although in the meantime we are admiring Kris Kuksi’s mixed-media sculptural 
assemblages; see, for example, Kuksi, Divination and Delusion (Brunswick North, Victoria: 




Many of the posts were eventually absorbed by European states because of the expenses 
involved in maintaining them, but on and off, under different guises and for different 
purposes, European private enterprises would establish such dominions in Liberia—and of 
course throughout large parts of the world—until the nineteenth century.43 More permanent 
“colonization” as such only came in 1822, when the American Colonization Society, a private 
charity enjoying federal support in the United States, bought land—and “sovereignty” over 
it—from a local Liberian king to serve as a settlement for freed African-American slaves.44 
An official “state” came into being in 1847 that would last until 1980, when it collapsed into 
a period of intermittent civil war, funded by the international sale of blood diamonds and 
natural resources, that ended only in 2003. The country gradually began to rebuild and 
recover through international aid but also concession agreements with foreign 
multinationals, through which companies were given the rights to extract natural resources 
                                                          
43 See, broadly, Kwame Yeboa Daaku, Trade & Politics in the Gold Coast, 1600-1720, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1970 and, for the most famous surviving example in the region, P. 
E.H. Hair, The Founding of Castelo de São Jorge da Mina: An Analysis of the Sources 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, African Studies Program, 1994). 
44 Nicholas Guyatt, “Rethinking Colonization in the Early United States,” in Beverly C. 
Tomek and Matthew J. Hetrick (eds.), New Directions in the Study of African-American 
Recolonization (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2017), 329-350, at 329. On private 
empires in Africa see more generally Steven Press, Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in 




in their concession areas in exchange for payments and the provisioning of an array of public 
goods there. 
The example of the Luxembourg-based multinational ArcelorMittal is striking but 
representative. The world’s leading integrated steel and mining company, it is present in 60 
countries and has an industrial footprint in 19.45 In 2005, a legal predecessor of the company 
(Mittal Steel), signed a Mineral Development Agreement (MDA) with the post-civil war 
government of Liberia valid for 25 years and renewable for a second period.46 This gave the 
company the rights to explore and mine within a concession area covering 500 square miles—
larger than the city of Los Angeles, and half of Luxembourg—in the northern part of the 
country, including communities harboring 25,000 people officially unaffiliated with the 
company. As part of the company’s concession agreement with the government, it agreed to 
provide these people with healthcare and education, as well as ensuring the police and 
security of the region and taking care of its infrastructure needs. During the recent Ebola 
outbreak in the region, the company’s control and management proved vital for fighting the 
epidemic not merely within the concession area, around which its private security forces 
established a 30km buffer-zone, but throughout the country and, indeed, across West Africa. 
ArcelorMittal reported revenues of $57 billion and an operating income north of $4 billion 
                                                          
45 ArcelorMittal Annual Review (2015), http://annualreview2015.arcelormittal.com/fact-
book/mining-operations/iron-ore-production-and-shipment-by-geography. 
46 For an account of the merger and its pre-history, see Tim Bouquet and Byron Ousey, 
Cold Steel: Lakshmi Mittal and the Multi-Billion Battle for a Global Empire (London: Little, 
Brown Group, 2009). 
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in 2016. By comparison, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Liberia was barely $2 billion.47 
[INSERT IMAGE 7] 
  
                                                          
47 Sophus A. Reinert, Sarah Nam, and Sisi Pan, “ArcelorMittal and the Ebola Outbreak in 





Image 7 caption: from Joseph Mathews, ArcelorMittal “Mining in the Global 
Landscape: A Case Study from Liberia”, presented at the Global Landscapes Forum in 




A traditional historiographical chronology would focus on the birth, demise, and 
rebirth of the Liberian state. Yet, the country’s multiple histories also invite counter-
narratives, narratives focused not on the power of states but of corporations; not on the 
Leviathan but on the Kraken. For what bestial or monstrous form, really, best elucidates 
sovereignty in the history of Liberia from the age of the American Colonization Society to 
that of ArcelorMittal? Or for that matter long periods in the histories of Indonesia, Corsica, 
the Low Countries, and large swathes of our planet in more recent centuries? The Kraken, 
we would argue, meaningfully highlights a serious problem with how common categories of 
economics and political philosophy simply fail to explain lived historical experiences, in the 
past or, for that matter, the present. Scholars have long worked around a basic scheme in 
which the world is comprised of states of varying territorial extents, harboring firms that 
employ labor.48 The existence and cyclical importance of multinational corporations and 
other non-state actors in recent centuries has of course drawn historiographical attention, 
but has, so far, not changed our basic framework for thinking about such matters. Our 
argument is that a political economy true to the dynamics of world history to a far greater 
extent must come to terms with the tentacular reach and consequences of the Kraken in its 
myriad forms, and with the fact that de facto sovereignty can be claimed, and exercised, by 
actors that only tangentially are “political” in ways that align with the historiography of 
political thought. For history suggests that Krakens in the past sometimes have, in the 
                                                          
48 Robert Fredona and Sophus A. Reinert, “Introduction: History and Political Economy,” 
in id. (eds.), New Perspectives on the History of Political Economy (Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018), xi-xxxii, at xviii-xix. 
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present sometimes do, and in the future likely will, successfully compete with Leviathan 
claims on sovereignty. 
* * * 
Leviathans nonetheless remain. But even the greatest of the Leviathans seem to be 
intertwined with, if not wholly grappled by the tentacles of Krakens.  In Adam Tooze’s 
important recent account of the global financial crisis, Crashed, something like the 
Leviathan state appears to loom large, emerging like a colossal deus ex machina to stave off 
global implosion. In Tooze’s rigorous macrofinancial account, a complex meditation on the 
political implications of a still-developing crisis of economics, the focus is shifted away both 
from grand Streeckian inevitabilities and from the well-known asset crisis involving 
subprime mortgages to systemic fragility in the day-to-day funding of global banks, reliant, 
at least from the 1980s on, not on deposits but on short-term and rapidly-suspendable 
investment. The cascading, potentially annihilatory effects of a general liquidity freeze, 
“the equivalent of a giant bank run”, indeed a giant inter-bank run, a run of banks on 
other banks, are halted only when the US Federal Reserve, providing liquidity by opening 
up ultimately uncapped swap lines with other central banks, “without public consultation 
of any kind, made itself into a lender of last resort for the world”.49 The American state 
becoming the world’s “lender of last resort” at a time of economic precarity certainly 
suggests something like ultimate sovereignty in nuce, just as the French monarch’s role as 
“baker of last resort” at moments of severe grain shortage did, but things are not that 
                                                          
49 Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (New York: 
Viking, 2018), quotations at 144 and 203. 
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simple.50 In the America of 2008, and in the global economy that had supplanted the 
national economies of earlier generations, it would be nearly impossible to disentangle the 
interests and activities of the American state from the interests and activities of capital and 
investment firms and harder still to disentangle the interests and activities of academic 
economists from both. Though prosopography may not be destiny, it is telling that the 
global financial economy was saved by a former CEO of Goldman Sachs, an intimate of 
CitiGroup’s leadership, and a Princeton economist. As Tooze asks, of the pivotal moment 
in mid-October 2008 when US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson forced America’s largest 
                                                          
50 The necessity of a financial lender of last resort was theorized as early as the late 
eighteenth century, but perhaps most famously in Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A 
Description of the Money Market (New York: Scribner, 1873), 277, “as the Bank of England 
alone keeps the final banking reserve, the bill-brokers of necessity have to resort to that 
final reserve… at every panic”. On the French monarch as baker of last resort, see the 
magisterial works of Steven L. Kaplan on bread and politics in eighteenth-century Paris, 
among them The Bakers of Paris and the Bread Question, 1700-1775 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1996), 12, “The king, as nourishing prince, embodying the state, becomes 
not the victualer-of-every-day, though he oversees the modalities instituted to do this job, 
but the baker of last resort”; in other words, he does not personally feed his subject but 
ensures they will be fed in times of dearth. The “political theology” that uncomfortably 
links God, the state, and state finance (Christus-Fiscus), though brilliantly excavated by 
Ernst Kantorowicz, remains mysterious; The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval 
Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 164-192.  
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banks, strong and weak alike, to all accept cash from the TARP program, “If this was an 
act of sovereignty, whose sovereignty was it? The American state’s, or that of the “new 
Wall Street”—the network personified by figures like Paulson and Geithner who tied the 
Treasury and the Fed to America’s globalized financial sector?”.51  
The octopoidal, grasping and gripping, clearly remains a potent metaphor today. 
Indeed, when we glimpse the digital ocean of data in which we all swim, it may be more 
relevant than ever. In his recent book Exposed, Bernard Harcourt, among the most 
compelling critics of the present moment and of the discursive practices that birthed it, has 
described and theorized our “expository” society, in which, no longer passive and 
surveilled as in a Foucauldian panopticon, we now enthusiastically expose ourselves 
according to the logics of a digital political economy of desire. For Harcourt, such self-
exhibition has accompanied the creation of a surveillance Kraken composed of the state, 
intelligence agencies, intelligence sharing consortia among nations, and military interests, 
but also multinationals, data brokers, private consulting firms, Wall Street, and Silicon 
Valley. “The proper metaphor”, he writes, playing off the “not-too-subtle mascot” of a US 
surveillance asset, shown in image 8 [INSERT FOR BEST FIT], “is not the government 
agent at his console, but a large oligopolistic octopus that is enveloping the world… What 
we are facing today is not so much a ‘surveillance state’ as an amalgam, an oligarchy, a 
knot of tenticular statelike actors that see through us and our desire-filled digital lives”. 
And in the face of this Kraken, Harcourt has properly called for us to “entirely rethink the 
very notion of ‘the state’ in this digital age”, adding, incisively, “[t]he problem with the 
                                                          
51 Crashed, 198. 
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Weberian ideal type has always been the tendency to reify the state as the single entity that 
achieves legitimacy in force, when we have known for so long that so many other corporate 
entities also exercise not only symbolic but legitimate physical force”. Harcourt has long 
been calling attention to the outsourcing of state violence, of which private police forces 
and the prison-industrial complex are but two obvious examples, but he sees the 
transformations of the digital age as a “last straw”, rendering these things now “too 






                                                          
52 Bernard E. Harcourt, Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 78-79. Harcourt elsewhere writes tellingly and 
damningly of the “myth of the Leviathan state”, 55, and, having to mix his metaphors, also 
refers to the “knots of statelike power”—of pouvoir étatique, a Foucauldian expression—as 
a “Behemoth”, 215, one that “includes the NSA, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Amazon, 
Samsung, Target, Skype, and Microsoft”; each of these entities might, on their own, be 
described as Krakens, suggesting a Kraken di tutti krakens reminiscent of organizational 
forms other than the corporation. For some of Harcourt’s earlier and discussion of 
outsourced state violence, see the final two chapters of his masterpiece The Illusion of Free 
Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 





Image 8 caption: Logo for a classified satellite payload (NROL-39) launched by the 
National Reconnaissance Office, publically tweeted by Office of the Director of National 





One case in point might be that of Palantir Technologies, a Silicon Valley software 
firm co-founded by the right-wing libertarian billionaire Peter Thiel, who has fostered a 
number of links, direct and indirect, with the Trump administration. Well-connected in 
Washington through high-powered lobbying firms employing former US Senators and 
former high-ranking staff members of current Senators, and initially supported by seed 
money from the CIA’s venture capital firm In-Q-Tel, Palantir develops and sells data 
aggregation and analysis tools and services, which were developed for US military and 
intelligence agencies in the “War on Terror”, to private clients, to US government law 
enforcement agencies like ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), to major 
American municipal police departments, and even to UN organs like the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency).53 Putting aside the dark irony of the company’s 
                                                          
53 Peter Waldman, Lizette Chapman, and Jordan Robertson, “Palantir Knows Everything 
About You”, Bloomberg Businessweek, 19 April 2018, published online at 
www.bloomberg.com/features/2018-palantir-peter-thiel. Although we are wary of judging 
Palantir Technologies by Thiel’s philosophical musings and vice versa, it is interesting, at 
the very least, to note that, in a 2007 essay, Thiel noted that “the awareness of the West’s 
vulnerability” felt on 11 September 2001 had rendered the civil rights fundamentalism of 
the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) an “unviable anachronism”, and argued that 
“we should consider Echelon, the secret coordination of the world’s intelligence services, as 
the decisive path to a truly global pax Americana”; Thiel, “The Straussian Moment”, in 
Robert Hamerton-Kelly, ed., Politics and Apocalypse (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2007), 189-218, quotations at 190, 208. Even more warily, we note that 
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name—taken from the “far-seeing” magical stones of the Lord of the Rings, one of which 
leads to the wizard Saruman’s corruption—which was not lost on protesters at Thiel’s San 
Francisco mansion in March of 2017 who carried a sign reading “Don’t build software for 
Mordor”, the realm of the dark lord Sauron, the very selling point of Palantir Technologies 
seems to be its Kraken-like nature, its pervasive reach, its tentacular access to far-flung 
data.54 But when we think about the privatization of the state’s Weberian monopoly on 
legitimate violence, it is firms like Academi (formerly Blackwater and Xe Services), that 
perhaps first come to mind. Founded by Erik Prince, another right-wing libertarian well-
connected to the Trump administration (Betsy DeVos, his sister, is Education Secretary), 
who, as a White House intern during the presidency of George H. W. Bush, described US 
federal agencies as “Leviathan realized”, Academi provides private military services, 
though Prince himself rejects the term “mercenaries”, for private clients and government 
                                                          
Theil, in a kind of theologico-technological fantasy published recently in a conservative 
Catholic journal of ideas, has defended and cloaked in an apocalyptic aura (Goethe’s) 
Faust’s project of reclaiming land from the sea (a species of utopia, achieved by 
overcoming nature) with dikes and Mephistopheles’s help by reminding the reader that 
“the sea is the place where the demon Leviathan lives, and it symbolizes the chaos that 
must be rolled back”; Thiel, “Against Edenism”, First Things, June/July 2015, available 
online at www.firstthings.com/article/2015/06/against-edenism as of 11 July 2015.   
54 Anna Wiener, “Why Protesters Gathered Outside Peter Thiel’s Mansion This 




agencies, including the CIA.55 Academi’s activities are often unknown but, for instance, the 
New York Times has reported that Blackwater was hired in 2004 by the CIA to participate 
in “a secret program to locate and assassinate top operatives of Al Qaeda”.56 What we might 
once have thought of as the activities of states, at least in places where there are strong states, are 
now routinely carried out by private interests with secret influence and global reach. Kraken realized. 
* * * 
Writing in 1781 about the Kraken aboard the Swedish East India Company’s ship Finland, 
bound for Guangzhou, the Swede Jacob Wallenberg asked “I wonder if it [the Kraken] could 
not be the Leviathan of Job?”57 A sensible thought, especially in the confounded age of state-
companies and company-states. As Philip J. Stern has observed, “early modern states and 
                                                          
55 Prince’s recollection is quoted in Suzanne Simons, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik 
Prince and the Business of War (New York: Harper, 2009), 20; Erik Prince, Civilian 
Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror (New 
York: Penguin, 2013), 206: “We were ‘mercenaries’, people said. We were ‘cowboys.’ We 
were paid too much and beholden to no one—Bush’s private army, run by a Roman 
Catholic war profiteer.”    
56 Mark Manzetti, "C.I.A. Sought Blackwater's Help in Plan to Kill Jihadists", New York 
Times, 19 August 2009, online at www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/us/20intel.html. 
57 Jacob Wallenberg, Min Son på Galejan, Eller en Ostindisk Resa, Innehållande Allehanda 
Bläckhorns-Kram, Samlade på Skeppet Finland, Som Avseglade ifrån Götheborg i Dec. 1769, 
och återkom därsammastädes i Jun. 1771, 5th ed., (Stockholm: Elméns och Granbergs tryckeri, 
1835 [1781]), 42-43. 
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empires were not clearly defined structures but sets of de-centered processes, the product of 
the fuzzy tension among various legitimate rivals for power and sovereignty that defined 
early modern empire globally.”58  These rivals included then, as they do today, merchants 
and companies and stateless financial capital. But it is unwise to collapse the Kraken and the 
Leviathan into one being, especially now, as nation-state-centered discourses of legitimacy—
discourses that once, albeit only for a brief period, nearly crowded all the others off the 
conceptual field—are dissolving.    
For Nazi jurist and political philosopher Carl Schmitt, the Leviathan was a failed 
symbol and Hobbes’s flirtations with liberal and enlightenment values bore the very “seed 
of death that destroyed the mighty leviathan from within and brought about the end of the 
mortal god”.59 Perhaps, and perhaps all political forms and political symbols, destined to be 
replaced by others or to disappear along with human civilization, carry within them the seeds 
of their own destruction. In 1895 Hermann Gunkel, a leading proponent of the Göttingen 
Religionsgeschichtliche Schule, published his Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit, in 
which he argued, on the basis of Biblical parallels to earlier Near Eastern myths, that both 
                                                          
58 Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern 
Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 213-214. 
For another example, see Arthur Weststeijn, “The VOC as a Company-State: Debating 
Seventeenth-Century Dutch Colonial Expansion,” Itinerario, vol. 38, no. 1, 2014, 13-34. 
59 A seed quickly watered by the “liberal Jew” Spinoza; see The Leviathan in the State 
Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. George 
Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996), 57.  
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the cosmogony of Genesis and the eschaton of Revelation were marked by a Chaoskampf in 
which Leviathan, Behemoth, and the other great Hebrew beasts participated.60 Schmitt had 
read Gunkel and he knew that Leviathan was a symbol, an omen really, of both creation and 
destruction.  But what would happen when these Biblical symbols were wholly exhausted? 
And what would it mean for the apocalypse to come and human politics to continue?  
Near the end of 1940, but early in the more than a half-century’s correspondence 
carried on by Schmitt with the right-wing memoirist, novelist, and philosopher Ernst Jünger, 
the latter admitted that, though he knew of other mythical birds, the Phoenix and the Roc, 
he had never heard of Ziz, the “great bird” of Jewish lore greeted in the night, amidst the 
Chaoskampf—in one of Schmitt’s characteristically erudite references—by Behemoth’s 
“fierce howl”, and Jünger asked, almost uncannily, “Should the Jews have anticipated him 
as the lord of the skies beside Leviathan and Behemoth, who rule land and sea? As in every 
time since then, we find our own time described in the Bible; airplanes shall be the locusts of 
the Apocalypse.” Schmitt endorsed Jünger’s tentative, elemental, and apocalyptic system of 
correspondences—Air (Ziz), Sea (Leviathan), Land (Behemoth)—and would soon himself 
use the clash between Leviathan and Behemoth to great effect as a metaphor for the 
                                                          
60 Recently translated by K. William Whitney, Jr., as Creation and Chaos in the Primeval 
Era and the Eschaton: A Religio-Historical Study of Genesis 1 and Revelation 12 (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006). On Gunkel’s use of myth, see John Rogerson, Myth in Old 
Testament Interpretation (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1974), 57-65, and on the mythical “dragons” 
so central to Gunkel’s work, see the fascinating Calvert Watkins, How to Kill a Dragon: 
Aspects of Indo-European Poetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
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mutually-destructive clash between “sea power” and “land power”.61 Ziz’s appearance was 
brief, but Leviathan continued to splash about in the sea of their correspondence along with 
Moby-Dick, the great whale of Melville, whose works cast a powerful spell on Schmitt;62 “the 
economic world’s interest in these lordly animals”, Jünger noted, surely thinking of the 
scenes in Moby-Dick where the carcasses of whales are flayed, chopped up, and boiled down, 
“is that of an Abdeckerei”, a knacker’s yard or rendering plant.63 This striking image—the 
                                                          
61 Helmuth Kiesel, ed., Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt: Briefe 1930-1983 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
1999), 106-108 (letters of 3 and 8 November 1940). Schmitt replied (p. 109: 17 November 
1940) that he knew of the Ziz—so large that if one of its eggs fell to the earth it would fell a 
thousand of the cedars of Lebanon and cause a thousand rivers to overflow their banks—
“from the Talmudists and the Cabalists, who perhaps took him from Persia”. In a second 
reply (p. 110; 20 November 1940), Schmitt sent Jünger some verses he had composed about 
the Ziz “as a supplement to my information” about the three mythical creatures. On Ziz, 
whose name is derived from Psalm 50:11, see Lois Drewer, “Leviathan, Behemoth and Ziz: 
A Christian Adaptation,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 44 (1981): 148-
156. 
62 E.g., Richard Faber “Benito Cereno oder die Entmythologisierung Euro-Americas: Zur 
Kritik Carl Schmitts und seiner Schule,” in Faber, ed., Kultursoziologie: Symptom des 
Zeitgeistes? (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1989), 68–83. 
63 “Ich bin immer noch beim Moby Dick, der wirklich kosmische Züge besitzt. Mir kommt 
dabei oft die Strophe ‘und der Leviathan spielet’ in den Sinn, die glaube ich von Klopstock 
ist. Das Interesse der ökonomischen Welt an diesen herrlichen Tieren ist das einer 
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Leviathan being unmade and rendered down for the benefit of stateless and state-like 
economic powers and interests—is an image for our time.64  
But what could symbolize these powers,  greater in size and scope than even the 
Leviathan, of which it was once said that “non est potestas super terram quae comparetur 
                                                          
Abdeckerei,” Briefe 1930-1983, 127 (28 August 1941). The phrase does not seemingly 
appear in Klopstock, and was perhaps a misremembered paraphrase from Heinrich 
Heine’s Romanzero; see note on 564.  
64 A 1982 edition (Cologne: Maschke-Hohenheim) of Schmitt’s Leviathan uses, in a 
doubtlessly ironic way, Hendrick Goltzius’s “Der angespülte Fisch”, showing men 
measuring the carcass of a washed-up whale, for its title image; the original (Hamburg: 
Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938) employed a drawing of a whale-like fish on the hook, on 
which see Horst Bredekamp, Der Behemoth: Metamorphosen des Anti-Leviathan (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2016), 58-63. The “unmaking” associated with an Abdeckerei stands 
in almost complete contrast to the ritualized “unmaking” or “undoing” of animal bodies in 
the Middle Ages, often described in Chivalric hunting manuals, on which see Rebecca L. 
Pratt, “From Animal to Meat: Illuminating the Medieval Ritual of Unmaking”, 
eHumanista 25 (2013): 17-30. The poet and writer Wolfgang Hilbig used the image of an 
Abdeckerei, located amidst the industrial ruins of East Germany, powerfully in his Alte 
Abdeckerei (1991) and Sabine Nöllgen has ominously extended it as an image of humanity’s 
toxic impact on the earth; “The Darkness of the Anthropocene: Wolfgang Hilbig’s Alte 
Abdeckerei”, in Readings in the Anthropocene: The Environmental Humanities, German 
Studies, and Beyond, ed. Sabine Wilke and Japhet Johnstone (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).  
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ei”?65 If we are no longer, pace Jünger, seeking our political symbols in the Bible, why not in 
the stories and conjectures of fishermen and sailors and eighteenth-century natural 
philosophers? Why not off the coasts of Norway? Why not in the cold and opaque waters of 
the abyssopelagic zone?66 For, as no less an expert on the “lordly animals” of the sea than 
Herman Melville wrote to his friend Nathaniel Hawthorne, “Leviathan is not the biggest 
fish;—I have heard of Krakens”.67  
                                                          
65 As is inscribed on the famous frontispiece of Leviathan: “There is no power on the earth 
than can be compared to him,” Job 41:24 in the Latin of the Vulgate.  
66 Whether we believe in sea monsters or not, it is true that the lifeforms of the deepest 
ocean remain largely unknown or wholly undiscovered even today—and they are an 
ancient mystery: “[S]ince the sea is infinite and of unmeasured depth, many things are 
hidden,” wrote the second-century Cilician poet Oppian, expressing what must have 
seemed then (though no longer) an invincible truth, “and of these dark things none that is 
mortal can tell”; Oppian, Halieutica, or Fishing, I, 206-7, in A.W. Maur, trans., Oppian, 
Colluthus, Tryphiodorus, Loeb Classical Library 219 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2014). Architeuthis was first seen (via a remote camera system) in its natural habitat, 
at 900 meters depth, where surface light does not penetrate, off the Ogasawara Islands in 
2004; Tsunemi Kubodera and Kyoichi Mori, "First-Ever Observations of a Live Giant 
Squid in the Wild", Proceedings of the Royal Society B 272 (2005): 2583–2586.  
67 Herman Melville, Correspondence, ed. Lynn Horth (Evanston and Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library, 1993), 213, letter of [17?] 
November 1851.  
